Purdue University

Purdue e-Pubs
Purdue CIBER Working Papers

Krannert Graduate School of Management

1-1-1996

International Lending by US Banks
Neven Tomov Valev
Georgia State University

Follow this and additional works at: http://docs.lib.purdue.edu/ciberwp
Valev, Neven Tomov, "International Lending by US Banks" (1996). Purdue CIBER Working Papers. Paper 116.
http://docs.lib.purdue.edu/ciberwp/116

This document has been made available through Purdue e-Pubs, a service of the Purdue University Libraries. Please contact epubs@purdue.edu for
additional information.

International Lending by U. S. Banks

Neven Valev
Purdue University

96·010

Center for International Business Education and Research
Purdue University
Krannert Graduate School of Management
1310 Krannert Building
West Lafayette, IN 47907·1310
Phone: (317) 494·4463
FAX: (317) 494-9658

International Lending By US Banks
by N even Valev

Abstract

In 1984, the claims of US regional banks represented 44% of the claims of US rnoneycenter banks in Mexico, 4% in Indonesia, 101% in Sweden and 15% in Germany. In 1989, these
numbers changed to 25%, 7%, 38% and 51 %. What are the reasons for and implications of such
differences? In this paper, we offer an answer to these and some other related questions.
We offer a rriodeCiil which lenders differ in wealth endowments and choose the quality of .
information which they use in the process of foreign lending. We trace the effects of foreign and
domestic interest rates, quality of information, quality of the pool of lending opportunities, etc. on
the decision to acquire information. In an intertemporal framework, less-informed lenders have
the option to observe, at no cost, the behavior of better-informed lenders with a lag of one period
and infer information about the current conditions in a lending market or they may purchase
current information at a cost. The choice between the two options depends on the persistence of
economic conditions over time. In an extension, we derive lenders' choice of maturity structure.
To test these and other hypothesis we employ data on international lending by US banks
for the 1982-1992 period. Our empirical results confirm the validity of the main predictions of the
model.
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Introduction

In ''The Global Debt Crisis", John Makin [1984] writes: " There was another potentially
very dangerous aspect of the run-up in short-term lending during 1981-1982. Many of the loans
were put together by the large money-center banks with heavy participation of smaller, regional
banks in the United States. The regional banks were, understandably in view of their normal
specialization in domestic lending, not very well informed on the economic conditions in the
developing countries to which they started lending" I. Gwyne, "Selling Money" [1986], writes: "In
the absence of their own systems, the regionals paid close attention to what the big banks said.
They had no other resource, except to spend a lot of money to achieve what presumably be the
same end,,2. In the professional literature, "Some general explanations have focused on, for
instance, error of judgment by banks and the 'herd effect', i.e. ignorant followers rushing in while
the more knowledgeable have already gotten out". How much validity should one attribute to
such statements? If they contain truth, how could one put structure on the differences in lending
patterns of money-center and regional banks? What are the implications for the size and volatility
of international capital flows? In this paper, we attempt to answer, in a theoretical and empirical
framework, these and some other related questions.

Economics and Finance literature are abundant with explanations for why lenders lend to
countries. US banks lend to countries which are politically close to the US (Thapa and Mehta
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Pp. 216.
Pp. 69.
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Table 1
Outstanding Claims of Regional US Banks as a Percent of the
Outstanding Claims of US Money-Center Banks

Mexico
Brazil
Argentina
Chile
Korea
Taiwan
Indonesia
Venezuela
Colombia
Philippines

1984
44
21
21
39
33
21
4
19
20
12

1989
25
9
10
13
26
43
7
14
30
8

1994
18
13
11
19
20'
26
10
24
16
11

Japan
UK
France
Sweden
Canada
Germany
Italy
Spain
Yugoslavia
Australia

1984
25
75
27
101
41
15
38
27
26
19

1989
59
30
31
38 .
27
51
36
12
16
28

1994
30
34
36
10
33
34
24
10
5
11

Notes: Loan amounts are weighted by the capital size of money center bans and. respectively. regional banks. Source:
"Country Exposure Lending Survey" published by the Federal Reserve Bank.

[1991]) because they believe that they will be bailed out if necessary, banks may lend to protect
outstanding claims ( Krugman [1989]), private lending follows the cI:ll"ection of official lending
(Sachs [1989]). Lenders may lack information of the current indebtedness of a country and are
..

.

not able to assess the risk of default correctly (Kletzer [1984]). Managers of lending institutions

.

-

may be evaluated on the basis of their behavior relative to that of other managers and not
necessarily on the basis of ex post performance which leads to herd behavior (Sharfstein and Stein

[1990]). Lending exhibits different behavior for credit constrained and not-credit-constrained
countries (Nunnenkamp [1992]). The dimension which we want to add is probably best
summarized by the data presented in Table 1. These indicate the relative involvement of US
money-center and US regional banks in lending to a number of countries. There are substantial
differences in the mix of lenders across countries and over time. In 1984, the claims of US
regional banks represented 44% of the claims of US money-center banks in Mexico, 4% in
Indonesia, 101% in Sweden and 15% in Germany. In 1989, these numbers change to 25%, 7%,
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38% and 51% and, in 1994, to 18%, 10%, 10% and 34%. What are the reasons for and
implications of such differences?

We offer a model in which investors are differentiated on the basis of their wealth level,
we endogenously derive their choices of information sources and characterize their lending
behavior in terms of a number of model parameters such as foreign and domestic interest rates,
quality of information, quality of the pool of lending opportunities. Small banks may costlessly
observe large bank lending with a lag of one period and infer information about the current
conditions in a lending market or they may incur a cost and purchase current information. The
choice of small banks depends on the persistence of economic conditions in different countries. If
economic conditions are not persistent, the informational content of last period's behavior of the
infonned lenders (large banks) is diminished and less infonned lenders (small banks) may opt for
current information even if that involves a certain cost. In an extension, we derive the choice of
maturity structure. Longer maturities, along with costs associated with the sale of foreign assets in
secondary markets, implies portfolio adjustments which are not instantaneous.

To test these and some other hypothesis we employ data on intemationallending by US
banks for the 1982-1992 period. The data in our sample is semiannual and contain the outstanding
claims of US money-center, medium-sized and smaller regional banks in the largest nine

industrialized and nine developing borrowers from US banks in that period. The data are also
divided by type of borrower -- government, banks and nonfmancial institutions as well as by
maturity - less that one year, one to five years and more than five years. The source of the data is

3

the "Country Exposure Lending Survey" published by the Financial Institutions Examination
Council with the Board of Governors of the Federal reserve System.

Our empirical results confIrm the validity of the main predictions of the model. Small
banks follow the lagged behavior of large banks in developed countries while, in developing
countries, small banks follow the current patterns of large bank behavior. The degree of
development of the domestic financial system has a strong effect on the term structure of asset
portfolios and adjustment costs. ,Small bank lending is more volatile than large bank lending in
developed countries while, in developing countries, the opposite appears

to

be true.

In the next section we present our model. Then, we offer an interpretation of the model

and discuss its empirical implications. In the last two sections, we discuss the data and show our
empirical observations.

Static Model

There are two types of investment projects with respective returns

rH

and

rL •

Each

investor can also earn a return ro on a riskless asset. We assume that rH > r > rL and we say
O
that the state H has occurred when the return is r H and that the state L has occurred when the
return is rL • The prior probability that an H state will occur is a. Each investor receives a signal s

={H, L} such that:
Pre s =HI V = H ) =Pre s =LI V =L ) = Pi'

Pi

E

[1/ 2, p], P < 1

4

An investor's type is defined by her wealth and the informativeness of her signal:

(Wi' Pi). Wealth·

and investment are denominated in equal units and the price of a unit of investment is 1. Let m
denote the number of investment units purchased by an.investor. In what follows we assume that
investors invest only if their signals indicate a favorable state. Given that s

= H,

investor i's

problem is:

With a logarithmic utility function the optimal investment level of an individual investor is
characterized by the following expression:

( 1)

Expression (1) gives us intuitively appealing and standard comparative statics:

(2)

dm-j >
* 0
dm-j >
* 0 dW
dPi -

j

dm-j >
* 0 dm-j >
* 0
drH da -

Optimal investment level increases in wealth, the quality of information, the prior probability of a
good state, the returns in the good and in the bad state and decreases in the return of the riskless
asset. An interesting (and, also, empirically testable) question for us is the response of investment
flows to changes in the interest rates. In particular what type of investors are more/less likely to
move funds in larger amounts when rates change and, also, which countries are likely to
experience larger foreign inflows and outflows in response to changes in interest rate differentials?
Equation (3) is the cross partial of the return in the good state and quality of information:

5

(3)

An investor who has information of a better quality is less responsive to changes in interest rates.

The intuition is relatively straightforward: there are three ways by which expected returns are
enhanced: if interest rates are higher, if investors are able to distinguish between good and bad
projects or if the pool of projects contains a greater proportion of good projects. These three
alternatives substitute for each other and an improvement in anyone of them makes the other two
less important: higher interest

r~tes

are less important if the pool of projects or the quality of

information is improved, better information is less important if most projects are good, the quality
of the pool of projects is not as important if investors can correctly distinguish between good and
bad projects. Equation (4) is the cross-partial of

rH

and the quality of the pool of investments, ex:

(4)

and suggests that investment funds are less responsive to changes in interest rates in countries
with better investment pools. Equations ( 3 ) and ( 4 ) indicate that the response to an exogenous
change in interest rates differential is greatest in the case of an investor with low-quality
information who invests in a country with a low-quality project pool. However, greater wealth
implies a larger, in magnitude, response to changes in interest rates:
(5)

Assume that each investor has the option to purchase an additional signal s'

= {H, L}

such

that:

6

(6)

Pr( s'

=HI V =H ) =Pr( s' =LI V =L ) = q,

1 > q > p ~ 1/ 2

at cost K. Only after an investor has received his own free information s, he decides whether or
not to purchase an additional signal. We also assume that an investor will not invest either if his
fIrst signal indicates a bad state and he decides not to purchase the second signal or if he decides
to purchase the second signal and it indicates a bad state. In his decision to purchase the second
signal, the investor compares his expected utility with and without the additional information. We
look at the case when the first signal.indicates.a good.state:_

E( ul s = H) Pr( s' = HI s =H) + E( ul s = L) Pr( s' = LI s = H) - E( ul s = H) =

( 7 )

=g(Pi,q,K,a,rH,rB,rO) ~O

How does the decision of a given investor to purchase or not additional information depend on
the parameters of the model? Unfortunately, equation (6), written in an extended form, is an
unwieldy expression3 and we had to resort to numerical simulations in order to characterize some
of the effects. First, we look at the effects of the quality of information and wealth on the
purchase decision:

(8)

~(·»o ~(·)<O ~(·»O ~(·)<O
CJq
()Pi
dw i
CJK
The likelihood that an investor will purchase information increases in the quality of that

information and the investor's wealth and decreases in the cost of information as well as in the
quality the investor's own information.

Perhaps a more interesting question is how do changes in interest rates as well as the
average quality of investment projects affect the decision of investors to obtain better information:

3

See Appendix 1

7

(9)

The signs in (9) indicate that fewer investors will purchase additional information if
interest rates are higher or if the pool of projects is of a better quality. This results are consistent
with equations (3) and (4) -- the importance of better information is smaller if the returns or the
pool of projects are better. So, the proportion of less-informed investors in more developed
countries (which we associate with higher a) is greater. An increase in interest rates should,
according to the model, not only increase the total amount invested by all investors but will.also
change the mix of investors toward a higher proportion of less informed agents. An increase in the
riskfree interest rate will decrease overall investment but will induce more investors to purchase
additional information.

Intertemporal set-up
In this section we eliminate the decision taken by investors to purchase or not additional

information -- there is a group of n investors who have sufficient wealth to find it optimal to buy
information in each period and a group of I investors for whom it is never optimal to buy
information because their wealth level is not high enough. By
infonned investor and by

Wp

Wq

we denote the wealth of each

the wealth of an uninfonned. We also assume that Pi

=P =1/ 2

and we say, respectively, that the group who purchases signals is the group of the informed and
the rest are the uninformed. Equations (10) represent the transitional probabilities between states
in different periods:
•

8

( 10 )

= HI V,_I = H) = f3
= LI V,-I = H) =1- f3
= LI V,-I = L) = q>
= HlV,_1 = L)= 1 ~q>

Pr(v,
Pr(v,
Pr(v,
Pr(v,

Both types of investors observe total investment and can differentiate between the total
investment of the informed and the total investment of the uninformed. Investors do not, however,
observe the true realization of the state in any of the previous periods4 • In the beginning of each
period, each investor updates his subjective prior probability on the current state conditional on
investment amounts in previous periods and the transitional probabilities (10). Infonnation about
the true state in the previous period is contained only in the investment of the informed group
because they alone have private information of any value. The informed receive independent
signals of the same quality and the probability that n, of all n informed investors invest is equal to
the probability that n, of them receive a signal which indicates a good state:

( 11 )

= H) =q"' (1- q)"-",
Pr(n, invest in period tl V, = L) =(1- q)"' q"-n,

Pr(n,

invest in period tl V,

In the beginning of each period, each investor observes last period's investment by the
informed group and infers probabilities about the state last period :

Pr(V
t-I

( 12)

Pr(v,_1

q"t-I (1- q)"-"'-I Pr(v,_1 = H)
)=
=r ,
,-I
q"t-1 (1- q )"-"'-1 Pr(v,_t = H) + q",-I-" (1- q )"'-1 Pr(v,_t = L)

=HIN

= LI N,_,) = 1- r,

We can think of that assumption in the following terms: each investor knows what his individual project paid in
th end of last period but this does not help him locate a good project this period. There is a "fresh" supply of new
projects each period and the only way in which they are correlated between periods is through their average
quality.
4

9

Note that the number of informed who invested last period is known with certainty because each
investor knows the total informed investment as well as the optimal investment level of each
informed investor. Given the transitional probabilities ( 10 ), each investor infers the prior
probabilities on the state this period:

( 13 )

Pr(V: = Hln t_1' /3,qJ) =/3y t + (1- Yt )(1- qJ) = Bt
Pr(V: = Llnt_I ,/3,qJ) = qJ(1- Yt) + Yt(1- /3)= 1- Bt
Similarly to equation (1), the investment level of an individual informed and, respectively,

an individual uninformed agent ar~:

( 14 )

The only new element in (14) as compared to (1) is that the prior probability of a good
state is not constant but changes over time in response to changes in investment behavior. In
particular:

The greater the proportion of informed investors who invested last period, the greater the
probability that the state this period will also be good given that {3 -

(1 - qJ) ~ o. The condition

guarantees that the likelihood of a good state in the current period,_ given a good state in the
previous period, is sufficiently large. We associate larger

~

with developed countries because,

there, a sudden tum for the worse seems less likely than in a developing country. The main result
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of the above set-up is that larger informed investment last period implies an increase in both
informed and uninformed investment in the current period:
( 16 )

am ** ~o amI * >0
On - .
t

On t _ t

_

if

,B-(1-q»~0

t 1

If we accept the association of a higher

~

with more developed countries; we should expect that

the increase in investment this period for a given increase in informed investment last period will
be greater for more developed countries. In the less developed countries, uninformed investment
loses its informative value because good conditions last period do not necessarily imply good
conditions in the current period.

Extension: Two-Period Maturity. Adjustment cost
In the previous two sections of the model we talked of the response of investment to

changes in a number of parameters and we assumed throughout that these responses were
costless. In this section we introduce two-period maturity and adjustment costs. In the beginning
of each period, each investor has the option to invest only for the next period only or for two
periods. In the end of the first period, if the investor who opted for a two-period maturity wants
to sell the second-period portion of his asset he may do so at a cost Z. To simplify the exposition,
we assume that each investor knows the state of the world in the end of each period. In what
follows, we also assume that, in the beginning of period t, investors observed s,

=H

and V,-I

=H ,

i.e. last period's state was good and his signal for the current state also indicates a good state.
Expected utility for the next two periods, given a one-period maturity IS:

11

E(ula.{3.(f'. V,-I

=H.s, =H.one- period maturity) =

= HlV, = H)
}
=p(v, = His, = H, V,-I = H) [P(V,+I =Hls'+1 = H)u(H + P(V,+I = LJS'+I = H)u(~)]+ +
{
P(S'+I = LI V, = H)u(W)
U(HI) + P(S'+I

1)

+ p(V,

= LJs, = H. V,-I = H)

{

U(~)+P(S'+I = HI V, = H)

}

[P(V,+l = Hls'+1 = H)u(HI ) + P(V,+I = LJS'+I
P(S'+I

= H)u( ~)] +

=LJv, =H)u(W)

agent's expected utility for the next two periods with a two-period maturity is:

E(ula.{3.(f'. V,-I

=H.s, =H.two -

period maturity) =

U(H2)+P(S,+1

=p(v, =HIs, = H, V,-I = H)

[P(V,+I =
{

P(S'+I

=HI V, =H)

Hlsr~1 = H)u(H2) + P(V,+I = Lls,+, = H)u(~)] + +

=LIV, =H)u(W -

Z)

U( ~) + P(S'+I = HI V, = H)
+ p(v, = LJs,

=H, V,-I = H)

[P(V,+I = Hls,+,
{

P(S'+l

}

=H)u(H2) + P(V,+I = LJs'+1 = H)u(~)]+

= LJ V, = H)u(W -

}
.

Z)

denote the expected utility with one-period maturity by Eu(l) and, with two-period maturity, by
Eu(2). The investor chooses a two-period maturity investment if:

Appendix 3 provides the explicit expressions for equation (17). We used numerical
simulations to characterize the effects of the parameters on the decision to invest in a two-period
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maturity project. Not surprisingly, given a positive cost of adjustment Z, agents invest in a twoperiod project only if the returns with a two-period maturity are sufficiently greater. The
proportion of two-period maturities is larger for countries where the wedge between short and
long-term rates is greater.

Greater wealth makes it more likely that an investor will choose a two-period maturity
because the cost of adjustment is proportionately smaller.. Investors with better quality
information are more likely to invest in longer maturities because, given

St

= H , the likelihood

that the state will turn to the worse in the second period is smaller. There are fewer long-term
maturities in countries where the adjustment cost is higher. An increase in r lowers the optimal
O
investment level with both types of maturities, increases the expected utilities but its effect on the
decision to invest in a long-term project is ambiguous.

Interpretation and Empirical Implications of the Model

The model suggests that large banks possess information of a better quality and that small
banks infer signals about the conditions in a country from the lending behavior of large banks.
Small banks may costlessly observe last period's large bank investment or they may participate, at
a certain cost, in syndicated loans which are originated by the large banks. The relative
attractiveness of the two alternatives for small banks depends on the persistence of conditions in
individual countries. An increase in large banks investment last period increases the likelihood that
the state was favorable last period and it will also increase the likelihood that the state is favorable
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this period if the conditions in the country are stable over time, i.e. if the likelihood of a sudden
downturn is small. For such countries, the behavior of large banks in the previous period has an
informative value. If the conditions are not stable over time, small banks become willing to incur a
certain cost in order to use the current information of large banks, i.e. participate in syndicated
loans. So, to the extent that conditions are more stable over time in industrialized countries as
compared to developing countries, we should expect that, in developed countries, small bank
behavior is correlated with large bank behavior in the previous period and, in developing
countries, it is correlated with large bank behavior in the current period. In addition, there should
be no correlation between the behavior of small banks last period and large banks' behavior this
period in any country.

If large banks possess better or, at least, more timely information, then they should

respond to certain changes in the conditions of a country in a more timely manner than small
banks. Based on that, we should expect that adjustments in the portfolio of large banks are easier
to explain given some current or recent characteristics of a country.

The model also suggests that less informed agents are more responsive to exogenous
changes in the interest rates differentials because it is primarily the interest rate, and not better
infonnation, that makes less-infonned investors adjust their asset portfolios.

Given loan maturity, over the span of which exogenous conditions may change
substantially, and costs associated with cashing a foreign asset we should expect that banks
cannot attain their desired portfolios instantaneously, i.e. we expect that bank lending is

14

Table 2
Outstanding Claims and New Lending by US Banks

Large bank inflows (six months period)
Small bank inflows (six months period)

Mean
D-ed
D-ing
-151.8
104.9
-88.5
-71

Total Large bank loans
Large bank loans to banks
Large bank loans to governments
Large bank loans to nonfmancial institutions
Large bank loans with maturity of less than 1 year
Large bank loans with maturity of 1 - 5 years
Large bank loans with maturity of over 5 years

6376
3144
651
2593
4633
1029
659

5664
937
3299
1444
2533
1418
1711

5838
3619
447
2582
4826
691
568

4343
984
3081
1236
1836
1568
1957

Total Medium bank loans
Medium bank loans to banks
Medium bank loans to governments
Medium bank loans to nonfmancial institutions
Medium bank loans with maturity of less than 1 year
Medium bank loans with maturity of 1 - 5 years
Medium bank loans with maturity of over 5 years

2053
1459
121
467
1671
245
131

1443
482
580
379
745
344
353

2023
1716
123
420
1822
228
107

1346
516
628
502
642
455
445

Total Small bank loans
Small bank loans to banks
Small bank loans to governments
Small bank loans to nonfinancial institutions
Small bank loans with maturity of less than 1 year
Small bank loans with maturity of 1 - 5 years
Small bank loans with maturi of over 5 ears

2755
2385
129
232
2390
234
114

1270
439
532
299
622
350
298

3575
3415
146
213
3419
199
90

1539
487
757
535
692
531
523

Descri tion

SD
D-ed
1027.6
725.8

D-ing
488.9
186.2

Note: 198 observations for each sample statistic. All numbers are in Smill. Source: "Country Exposure Lending Survey" semiannual data
for the period 1982-1992.

autocorrelated and we also expect to fInd the sources for that in the term structure of their loan
portfolios.

Data

We employ semiannual data on US bank lending

to

18 countries for the period 1982 -

1992. The data represent outstanding claims of US banks by country, by type of borrower, by

15

Table 3
Country characteristics employed as explanatory variables in the Results Section

Description
Country risk rating from a semiannual poll of. bankers (a)
GNP per capita (current dollars) - in thousands
(b)
Domestic investment as a percent of GDP
(b)
Exports as a percent of GDP
(b)
US exports to that country ( in $bill)
(e)
Total foreign debt as a percent of GNP
(d)
Service on foreign debt as a percent of exports
(d)
Interest (Return in USD) on newly contracted debt
(d) .
Average maturity on newly contracted foreign debt
(d)

Mean
D-ed
83
14.2
22.5
23.4
16.9

D-ing
38.5
2.03
21
22
5.06
57
15
9.26
9'.59

D-ed
8.53
5.56
5.01
6.61
19.6

SD
D-ing
12.9
1.25
7
9.22
6.9
24
8.6
2.1
2.75

Note: 198 observations, Developed countrics: Japan. UK. France. Sweden. Canada. Gennany, Italy, Spain, Ausua1ia. Yugoslavia.
Developing countries: Mexico. Brazil. Korea, Taiwan. Colombia. Philippincs. Indonesia. Chile. Argentina. Venezuela.
bankel1i are asked to raIe each
(a) Compiled from semiannual poUs conducted and reponed by "Institutionallnvcslor", Leading International
country on a credit risk scale of I to 100 with 100 being lowest risk.
(b) Compiled from "World Development Report" various yeal1i.
(e) Compiled from "World Debt Tablcs" various yeal1i

maturity structure and by the type of US banks: money center banks, medium size banks and small
regionals. Appendix 1 presents a list of the money center and medium sized banks as of June 1992.
The data set includes all US banks which, in the current period, have either a foreign branch or
have at least $20 mill. in outstanding foreign loans. The source of the data is "Country Exposure
Lending Survey" which is published quarterly by the Financial Institutions Examination Council at
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve. The survey was originated in 1975 as an annual,
then, in 1977, semiannual publication but the division into large, medium and small banks was first
introduced in 1982. The data cover around 100 countries and our sample of nine industrialized
and nine developing countries includes the largest foreign borrowers during the period 19821992. A list of the countries in the sample is available in the notes to Table 3 and Table 2 contains
definitions and sample statistics on the loan amount variables which we employ.
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The choice of country characteristics, which are presented in Table 3, is discussed in the
subsequent sections. The data were compiled from various years of the "World Development
Report", the ''World Debt Tables" both of which are published by the World Bank as well as from
the "Institutional Investor".

Results

Table 4 shows the results from four regressions in which we tried to capture in a simple form the
basic structure of relationships between large and small bank investment. The independent
variables are the yearly adjustments in the stock of outstanding debt by large and small banks in
developed and developing countries and the independent variables are the current year and the
previous year net inflows from both large and small bankss. In developed countries, an increase in
large bank investment leads to an increase in small bank investment during the next year but an
increase in small bank investment does not lead to an increase in large bank investment in the
subsequent period. In developing countries, large and small bank investment are correlated in the
current year but not across time and small banks do not seem to follow the pattern of large bank
behavior from the previous period. The autocorrelation of both small and large bank investment is .
discussed later in the paper.

The literature on foreign lending by US banks has identified and, in some cases, tested a
number of hypothesis about the determinants of bank lending (Nunnenkemp [1992], Thapa et al
[1991]) to foreign countries. The results of these studies are intuitively appealing -

S

We also included investment with lags of more than one year but the basic results were unaltered.
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Table 4
Dependent Variable: Net Inflow/Outflow of US Bank Funds

Large bank inflow this period
Large bank inflow last period
Small bank inflow this period
Smallbankinflowlastperiod
Constant
R 2 I Number of obs.

Develo ed
Large bank inflow Small bank inflow
0.11 (1.50)
0.53 (5.34)
0.17 (2.07)
0.22 (1.50)
-0.19 (-1.50)0.61 (9.17)
-148 (-1.41)
-2.05 (-0.26)
0.33 I 90
0.55 I 90

Develo in
Large bank inflow Small bank inflow
0.09 (2.11)
0.77 (9.92)
-0.04 (-0.92)
0.66 (2.11)
-0.36 (-1.21)
0.68 (8.37)
-22.4 (-0.32)
-34.8 (-1.27)
0.59 I 80
0.66 I 80

Notes: OLS eslinWcs. T stalistics are in brnclcets. One period is one year beginning in January.

macroeconomic stability; a better capacity" to service foreign 'debt;'"FDI investment, low US
interest rates, etc. all contribute to larger US bank lending. It is not the purpose of the present
analysis to identify the determinants of foreign lending in general; we want, however, to provide
indications that large banks do, indeed, possess better or, at least, more current information. In a
literature survey paper, Allber [1984] summarizes that one of the main reasons that banks open
foreign branches is to provide service to their domestic clients or at least, not to lose them to
foreign

bank competitors. Gwyne [1984], on the other hand, suggests that US exporters

represent an important source of information about foreign borrowers and that smaller US
regional banks who work closely with the exporters at home are the main beneficiaries of this
information. Even though opinions differ as to which banks benefit and in what way, it seems to
be a common view that US exports are a source of information for US banks. We included the
last year's increase ( decrease) in US exports to each country to account for improvements in the
information base of US banks with the implicit hypothesis that large banks are better positioned,
through their existing foreign branch network, to take immediate 3;dvantage of an increase in

6 Lagged changes in exports improves the fit of the model compared to current changes without changing the rest
of the results. It seems that the benefit of infonnation has a delayed effect, if any.
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Kletzer [1984] offers an explanation of the US bank overlending to developing countries .
in the 70's and early 80's which is based ·on the assumption that all information about the
indebtedness of these countries was not current and this lead to a miscalculation of the risks
involved in international lending. It is likely that banks which have offices in a country should have
a better and more timely information about the build-up of foreign debt than banks which rely on
delayed international statistics. So, we fonned the hypothesis that large banks can recognize a
build-up of foreign debt sooner and scale down their holdings of foreign assets in a more timely
manner. There are a number of problems with such a hypothesis. First, the build-up of foreign
loans which lead to the debt crisis of the early 1980's was associated mainly with large banks
which does not indicate a possession or a use of superior information on their part. Gwyne [1984]
writes: " Even Citicorp which held $3 bill. In Mexican debt did not know until Silva told him the
next evening,,7. Second, as Krugnan [1989] suggests, debt build-up may induce lenders to extend
further credit in order to protect outstanding claims.

Equation ( 3 ) suggests that less infonnedagents are more responsive to changes in
interest differentials. The World Bank publishes an annual weighted average of contractual
interest rates8 on newly extended credit for all developing countries9 but these are most likely
endogenous and, further, they are not available under the same defInition for developed countries
so, to test the hypothesis, we included the change in US Treasury bill rate over the current year.

The event in question is 1982 insolvency of Mexico. Gwyne [1984], pp. 25.
Nominal return in dollars.
9 Source: World Debt Tables.
7

8

19

Table 5
Dependent Variable: Net Inflow/Outflow of US Bank Funds

Large bank inflow this period
Large bank inflow last period
Small bank inflow this period
Small bank inflow last period
Change in US exports last per
Change in US T-bill rate
Change in foreign debt/GDP
Constant
2

R

I Number of obs.

Develo ed
Large bank inflow
Small bank inflow
0.11 ( 1.37)
0.52 ( 4.81)
0.14 ( 1.65)
0.22 ( 1.37)
-0.18 (-1.09)
0.72 ( 8.84)
20.8 ( 0.48)
-3.15 (-0.11)
20.2 ( 0.22)
-136 (-2.26)

-169 (-1.14)
0.30 I 81

-23.5 (-0.23)
0.60 I 81

Develo in
Large bank inflow Small bank inflow
0.08 ( 1.76)
0.75 ( 9.46)
-0.02 (-0.39)
0.55 ( 1.76)
-0;17 (-0.52)
0.66 (7.32)
55.01 (1.11)
21.8 ( 1.16)
-19.6 (-0.40)
-38.6 (-2.14)
-398 ( -1.30)
144 ( 1.28)
-48.3 (-0.60)
-66.9 (-2.29)
0.68 I 73
0.64 I 73

Notes: OLS estimates. T statistics arc in brackets. One period is one year begiMing in January.

Table 5 presents the results from the estimation of the same equations as in Table 4 with
the inclusion of the change in foreign debt/GOP, the change in US exports last year and the
change in the US T-bill rate. Changes in US exports appear to have no significant effect on the
lending behavior of either large or small banks and this result persists when the sample includes all
banks and all countries. Later, in Table 7, we report results which suggest that

developing

countries which import more from the US are also more likely to receive a larger proportion of
loans from small US banks but this effect seems cumulative over time and indistinguishable on a
year-by- basis. As predicted by the model, small banks are more responsive than large banks to
exogenous changes in interest rate differentials in both developed and developing countries.
Again, small banks follow large banks in developed countries and participate in syndicated loans
in developing countries.

The effect of changes in the debt/GDP ratio have the predicted signs but the coefficients
are not statistically significant. An increase in indebtedness, for potentially problem borrowers,
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Table 6
Oependent Variable: Net Inflow/Outflow of US Bank Funds

Large bank inflow this period
Large bank inflow last period
Small bank inflow this period
Small bank inflow last period
Change in US exports last per
Change in US T-bill rate
Change in Credit Rating
Ch. in Investment/GOP last p
Ch. in GOP per capita last p.
Ch. in Exports/GOP last per.
Ch. in foreign debt/GOP
Ch. in ServicelExports
Constant

R

2

I Number of obs.

Develo ed
Large bank inflow
Small bank inflow
0.09 ( 1.08)
0.52 ( 4.65)
0.15 ( 1.68)
0.18 ( 1.08)
-0.16 (-0.94)
0.72 ( 8.29)
11.6 ( 0.26)
-8.08 (-0.25)
-31.3 (-0.32)
-156 (-2.29)
-8450 (-1.27)
-1383 (-0.28)
682 ( 0.46)
383 ( 0.36)
1208 (0.91)
519 ( 0.57)
-2094 (-1.46)
-235 (-0.22)

-296 (-1.63)
0.36 I 81

-78.3 (-0.59)
0.60 I 81

Develo in
Large bank inflow Small bank inflow
0.09 ( 1.84)
0.75 ( 9.21)
-0.23 (-0.48)
0.61 ( 1.84)
-0.15 (-0.47)
0.64 ( 6.98)
75.7 ( 1.29)
12.6 ( 0.56)
-54.7 (-0.98)
-33.8 (-1.62)
-2055 (-1.79)
513 ( 1.16)
-155 (-0.56)
25.4 ( 0.24)
292 ( 0.52)
-37.9 (-0.18)
63.2 ( 0.23)
113 ( 1.14)
226 ( 1.65)
-604 (-1.68)
-9.34 (-0.05)
-50.3 (-0.76)
-74.6 (-0.88)
-62.5 (-2.01)
0.70 I 73
0.66 I 73

NOles: OLS estimates. T statistics arc in brackets. One period is one year beginning in January.

should induce large banks to scale down their foreign asset holdings because they, presumably,
recognize the build-up. Small banks should be either unaffected or they may interpret the increase
in debt as a signal of improved conditions. Indeed the sign of the debt/GOP coefficient is negative
for large banks and positive for small banks but both are insignificant. US bank lending represents
a certain percent of the change in total debt of a country and, in view of that, a negative
coefficient for large banks would be particularly interesting.

Next, we added last year's changes in the investment/GOP and exports/GOP ratios, GOP
per capita and, for developing countries, foreign debt service as a percent of exports. These
should proxy for changes in the overall economic conditions of a country as well as its debt
service and repayment capabilities. We also added the change in the credit rating of each country
which was obtained from semiannual surveys reported in the "Institutional Investor". These
ratings are readily available to all lenders and supposedly proxy for the level, quality and direction
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of public information. The estimates are reported in Table 6. None of the newly included
variables, with the exclusion of credit ratings, have a significant individual effect on lending. An
improvement in the credit rating of a developing country appears to induce a decrease in large
bank lending. Our expectation was that credit rating have a stronger and positive effect on the
lending patterns of small banks but this result does not obtain. An interesting result is the negative
and significant coefficient of the debtlGDP ratio for large banks, especially in comparison with the
positive and significant coefficient for small banks. As we earlier noted, though, this result is not
robust.

We estimated a variety of specifications where the dependent variable is large bank inflows
as a percent of either small bank inflows or total inflows. Our intention was to capture in a direct
way the exogenous detenninants of a particular mix of lenders but the results we obtained were
generally not significant lO • It seems that it is difficult to identify a robust set of determinants of

Table 7
Dependent Variable: Large Bank Outstanding Claims/Small Bank Outstanding Claims

Credit rating
GDP per capita
InvestmentlGDP
Exports/GDP
US exports
Service paymentslExports
DebtlGDP
constant
R 2 / Number of observations

All countries
-0.08 (-5.39)
-0.04 (-0.74)
0.10 (2.54)
-0.02 (-0.80)
-0.02 (-1.18)

Develo ed
-0.08 (-3.64)
-0.08 (-2.80)
0.14 (3.83)
-0.05 (-2.08)
-0.003 (-0.37)

9.66 (10.6)

9.46 (6.13)
0.19 / 198-

0.25 I 396

Develo
-0.19
0.81
0.20
-0.01
-0.28
-0.06
-0.14
18.3
0.10

in
(-2.36)
(1.39)
(1.57)
(-0.14)
(-1.64)
(-1.64)
(-1.06)
(3.89)
/ 181

Notes: OLS estimates. T statistics are in brackets. One period is one year beginning in January.

10

Available upon request.
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bank lending and that a variety of factors influence the decisions of each lender with different lags
and weighs attached to them. A less precise way of identifying the determinants of the mix of
lenders is to look at total outstanding claims rather than at inflows. That may give us a general
indication of which countries, on average, tent to receive loans from a certain mix of lenders. We
tried to explain the proportion of large bank outstanding claims as proportion of small bank
outstanding claims with the help of the country characteristics discussed above. The results are
reported in Table 7. The proportion of small bank lending is higher relative to large bank lending
for countries with better credit ratings. In developed countries, the ratio of large/small bank
lending decreases in credit ratings, GDP per capita and the size of the export sector. In developing
countries, the ratio decreases in the credit ratings, size of the export sector but also in the
indebtedness of a country. Unlike for inflows, one can find a significant set of determinants of the

mix of lenders which indicates that the effect of a number of decision factors is cumulative over
time. One of the reasons why these effects do not seem to be immediate is probably the existence
of adjustment costs.

In all estimations we find that both small and large bank lending are highly autocorrelated.

Table 8 presents correlations of the level of outstanding debt this period with the level of debt

Table 8
Correlation Between the Current Level of Outstanding Debt and the
Level of Outstanding Debt Six Months Ago
CountrylBank
All countries
Developed countries
Develo in countries

All banks
.72
.53
.91

Lar e banks
.72
.61
.84

Small banks
.72
.45
.98

Notes: 198 observations for developed countries and 181 observations for developing countries.
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Table 9
Dependent Variable: Correlation of Current Level of Outstanding Claims and the Level of
Outstanding Claims Six Months Ago

Demand DepositslM1
constant
R 2 / Number of observations

All countries, all banks
0.008 ( 4.07)
-0.119 (-0.87)
0.34 /34

Notes: Two observations per country - small and large banks. Sweden is excluded because of an incompatible definition of MI. 01.5
estimares. T statistics arc in brackets.

last period. A positive correlation indicates that changes in banks' portfolios are not instantaneous
and it takes more than one period (six months) for the banks to make the desired adjustment.
The correlation is greater in developing countries for each type of banks, small bank correlation is
greater than large bank correlation in developing countries and, in developed countries, large bank
correlation is greater.

To identify the source of adjustment costs we followed a generally standardized method
(Anderson [1993]). First. we calculated the correlation between the levels of current and lagged
debt for large and small banks for each country and then· we regressed the correlations on the
proportion of demand deposits in the money stock (M 1) for each country in the sample. The
results from the regression are reported in Table 9. The greater the proportion of demand deposits
in MI. the smaller the correlation and, implicitly, the smaller the adjustment cost. What was our
motivation to

try

and explain these correlations by means of the DDIM1 ratio?

Banks extend loans over the maturity of which exogenous conditions change and they
incur costs in the secondary markets in order to attain their desired portfolios. Table 10 provides
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Table 10
Proportion of Total Outstanding Claims with Maturity of One Year or Less
Count '!Bank
All countries
Developed countries
Develo inc countries

All banks
.62
.73
.51

Lar e banks
.57
.67
.47

Small banks
.67
.79
.54

Notes: 198 observations for developed and 181 observations for developing countries.

the proportion of US bank debt which has a maturity period of less than one year. Large banks
extend loans with longer maturity periods in both developed and developing countries. Both types
of banks extend loans with longer maturities in developing countries which may indicate that, in
developing countries, the differential in returns on long and short-term credit is substantial enough
to outweigh the potential cost of cashing some of the debt on the secondary market.
Underdeveloped financial system are characterized by larger spreads between short and long-term
rates, low intensity of competition between intermediaries as well as a predominance of short
term-credit (Diaz-Alehandro [1985]). So, we suggest that foreign banks are more likely to lend
directly and long-term to nonfinancial institutions in countries with less-developed banking
systems. In countries with developed financial systems, more US funds are intermediated through
the domestic banking system. Indeed the correlation between the proportion of short-term credit

in all credit and the proportion of total credit which is extended to domestic banks is positive and
strongly significant.. Table 11 shows the estimates from two equations in both of which the
independent variable is the correlation of the current and last periods' level of debt. The results
suggest that banks face adjustment costs because of long-term maturity -- the correlation is
greater where most of the debt is not intermediated through domestic banks or, equivalently,
where most of the debt is long term.
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Table 11
Dependent Variable: Correlation of Current Level of Outstanding Claims and the Level of
Outstanding Claims Six Months Ago

Proportion of credit to banks in total
Proportion short-tenn credit in total
constant
R 2 1 Number of observations

(2)

(1)
-0.59 (-4.36)

0.93 (13.4)
.37/34

-0.75 (-2.31)
0.44 (2.08)
.14 1 34

Notes: Two observations per .counlJ'y - small and large banks. Sweden is excluded because of an incompatible definition of MI.
estimales. T statistics are in braclcets.

oLS

We adopted the proportion of demand· deposits' inMl to proxy for the. degree of
development of the domestic fniancial system where a greater proportion indicates a higher level
of development. The hypothesis which we test is that a larger proportion of demand deposits in
Ml implies a shorter tenn structure of US bank credit to the respective country and, respectively,
smaller implicit adjustment costs. Table 12 reports the results from testing the former hypothesis
and Table 9 earlier reported the results from the test of the latter hypothesis.

Finally, we created a dummy variable which takes the value of one ifthe observation is of
a large bank, we interacted it with the proportion of demand deposits into Ml and included it in
regressions where the independent variables were the percent of loans which are extended to
banks, the proportion of credit that is short tenn and the correlation of the levels of debt in the

Table 12
Dependent Variable: Proportion of Outstanding Claims With
Maturity of One Year or Less

Demand DepositslM 1
constant
R2 1Number of observations

All countries, all banks
0.006 ( 4.93)
0.229 (2.86)
0.43 134

Notes: Two observations per counlJ'y - small and large banks. Sweden is excluded because of an incompatible definition of MI.
estimates. T statistics are in brackets.

oLS
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Table 13
Dependent Variable: Proportion of Outstanding Claims With
Maturity of One Year or Less

Demand DepositsIM 1
Demand DepositslM1*Largedum
constant
R 2 1 Number of observations

All countries
0.006 (5.57)
-0.001 (-2.15)
0.23 (3.02)
0.51 134

Develo ed
0.007 (2.42)
-0.001 (-2.13)
0.23 (1.00)
0.42 1 16

Develo in
0.004 ( 1.67)
-0.001 (-1.15)
0.36 (3.19)
0.18 1 18

NoteS: Two observations per country - small and large banks. Sweden is excluded because of an incompatible definition of MI. OLS
estimates. T statistics are in brackets.

current and previous periods.

~able

13 shows the estimated coefficients from three equations

where the dependent variable is the proportion of short-term debt in total debt. The positive sign
of the coefficient of demand depositslMl ratio indicates that the more developed the domestic
financial system. the greater the proportion of foreign lending which is intermediated through
domestic banks and is short-term as we noted earlier. A negative sign on the interaction term
indicates that this is less true for large banks, i.e. large banks are better positioned, supposedly
through foreign branches, to locate and lend to nonfinancial borrowers even in the conditions of
greater competition from domestic banks. Indeed, the sign of the interaction term is negative and
significant with the exception of developing' countries' where the coefficient is not statistically
significant. The coefficient of the interaction term is negative and significant in regressions where
the independent variable is the proportion of credit which is directed to domestic banks. The
coefficients lose their significance when the independent variable is the correlation of this period's
and last period's levels of debt.
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Conclusion

We endogenize lenders' decision to acquire information in international markets. Lenders
endowed with less wealth do not purchase additional information. Instead they observe the
behavior of larger investors and infer information about economic conditions. Small lenders may
costlesslyobserve last period's investment by large lenders or they may participate in syndicated
loans originated by large lenders. In this basic framework, we develop a number of implication
about the behavior of the two types of lenders, maturity structure and adjustment costs. Data on
international US bank lending

~

employed to test the main results of the model. Our empirical

observations confIrm, in general terms, the predictions of the model.

28

References

Aliber, Robert Z. "International Banking: A Survey" Journal of Money. Credit and Banking, Vol.
16, No.4 (November 1984, Part 2),661-678.

'.

Anderson, Patricia M. "Linear Adjustment Costs and Linear Demand: Evidenc{: From Retail
Trade fInns" Quarterly Journal of Economics, November 1993, 1015-1042.
Benabou, R. "Using Privileged Information to Manipulate Markets" Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 1992.
Bergsten, C., William Cline and John Williamson "Bank Lending to Developing Countries: The
Policy Alternatives" Institute for International Economics, April 1985.
Claessens, S., M. Dooley, and A. Warner "Portfolio Flows: Hot or Cold?" The World Bank
Economic Review, 1995, 153-174
Claudon, Michael (edt.) World Debt Crisis: International Lending on Trial, Ballinger, 1986
Delvin, R. Debt and Crisis in Latin America: The Supply Side, 1989.
Diamond, Douglas, "Reputation Acquisition in Debt Markets" Journal of Political Economy,
1989,828-862.
Diaz-Alejandro, Carlos, "Good Bye Financial Repression, Hello Financial Crisis" Journal of
Development economics 19 (1985) 1-24.
Eaton, J. and M. Gersovitz "Debt With Potential Repudiation: Theoretical and Empirical
Analysis" Review of Economic Studies, 1981. 289-309.
Edwards, Sebastian, "LDC Foreign Borrowing and Default Risk: An Empirical Investigation,
1976-80" The American Economic Review, September 1984, 727-734.
Eichengreen, B., Tames Tobin and Charles Wyplosz, "Two Cases for Sand in the Wheels of
International Finance" The Economic Journal, 1995, 162-172.
Federal Financial Institution Examination Council Country Exposure Lending Survey, 1982 1995.
Gwyne, S.c., Selling Money, 1984.
Institutional Investor, March and September editions for 1982 -1995.

29

Krugman, Paul "Private Capital Flows to Problem Debtors" in Developing Country Debt and .
Economic Performance, edt. Jeffrey Sachs, 1989
IMP, Determinants and Systematic Consequences of International Capital Flows, 1991.
Kletzer, Kenneth "Asymmetries of Information and LDC Borrowing With Sovereign Risk"
Economic Journal, June 1984.
Kyle, Albert "Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading" Econometrica, November 1985.
Makin, John, The Global Debt Crisis, 1986.
Mathieson, Donald "Managing Financial Risk in Indebted Developing Countries" IMP Occasional
Papers, 1989.
Nunnenkemp, Peter, "Detenninants of Voluntary and Involuntary Bank Lending to Developing
Countries in the 1980's" KYKLOS, 1992,555-576.
Ozier, Sule, " Commercial Bank Lending to Developing Countries: An Expansion of the Market"
Contemporary Policy Issues, 1989, 1-10.
Ozier, Sule, "The Evolution of Credit Terms: An Empirical Study of Commercial Bank Lending
to Developing Countries" Journal of Development Economics, 1992, 79-97.
Roussakis, E. (edt.) International Lending By US Commercial Banks: A Casebook, 1981.
Sachs, Jeffrey (edt.) Developing Country Debt and Economic Performance, 1989.
Sharfstein, D. and 1. Stein "Herd Behavior and Invaestment" American Economic Review, June
1990.
Thapa, S. and D. Mehta, "An Empirical Investigation of the Detenninants of the Supply of Bank
Loans to Less Developed Countries" Journal of Banking and Finance, 1991. 535-557.
Wang, Ch., On Improving the Structure of International Lending, 1990
<

Watson, Maxuell "International Capital Markets: Development and Prospects" IMP Occasional
Papers, 1988.
World Bank, World Development Report, various years.
World Bank, World Debt Tables, various years.

30

Table 14
Some Sample Means

Variable
Percent of total from large banks
Percent of total from medium banks
Percent of total from small banks

Develo ed
60
18
22

Develo in
71
16
13

Percent of total extended to local banks
Percent of total extended to governments
Percent of total extended to private nonfinancial institutions

53
15
32

22
49
29

Percent of large bank loans to banks
Percent of large bank loans to governments
Percent of large bank loans to private nonfmancial institutions

42

16
53
31

Percent of medium bank loans to banks
Percent of medium bank loans to governments
Percent of medium bank loans to private nonfmancial institutions

64

9
27

33
39
28

Percent of small bank loans to banks
Percent of small bank loans to governments
Percent of small bank loans to rivate nonfmancial institutions

76
9
15

38
40
22

17

41

Note: Number of observations is 198. Data is semiannual for the period 1982 - 1992 and is compiled from
"Country Exposure Lending Survey" - various years
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Appendix 1

Bank Names, Assets and Capital as of June, 1992
Large Banks

Medium Banks

Bank of America
Citibank
Chase Manhattan Bank
Morgan Guaranty
Chemical Bank
Continental Dlinois
Bankers Trust
First National of Chicago

Wells Fargo
Marine Midland
Mellon Bank
First National of Boston
National Bank of Detroit
Texas Commerce Bank
Bank of New York
Nationsbank Texas
Republic National of New York
First Interstate of California
First City National of Houston

Assets: Large Banks: $694.1 billion
Medium BankS: "$273.0 billion -." .
Small Banks: $766.0 billion
Capital:
Large Banks: $68.0 billion
Medium Banks: $26.4 billion
Small Banks: $71.3 billion
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Appendix 2. The decision to purchase additional information.
Investors solve the following problem:

Note:
Pr( s'

= HI s = H) = Pr(s' = HI V = H) Pr( V = HI s = H) + Pr( s' = HI V = L) Pr( V = LI s = H) =

=q

+ (1- q)

ap
ap + (1 - P)( 1 - a)

=

1

ap + (1 - P)( 1 - a)

=

(1- p)(l- a)
ap + (1 - p)( 1 - a)

[apq + (1 -

q)( 1 - a )( 1 - p )]

= A > Pr( s' = H)

Equivalently,
Pr( s'

= LI s = H) = Pr(s' = LI V = H) Pr( V = HI s = H) + Pr(s' = LI V = L) Pr( V = LI s = H) =

= ( l-q )
=

ap

.

ap + (1 - P)( 1 - a)
1

ap + (1 -

p)( 1 - a)

+q

(1 - P)( 1 - a)

ap + (1 - P)( 1 - a)

=

[ap(l - q) + q(l- a )(1- p)] = 1- A < Pr(s' = L)
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In essence, the prior on the good state is updated by the signal s before the signal s' is received..
The signals s and s' relate to the same underlying state. Expected utility when both signals
indicate a good state:

E(uls = H,s' = H) = u[(w +U[(w -

K)(1 + r )+ m(rH -

K)(l + ro) + m(rL -

o

ro)]pr(v = His = H,s' = H) +

'o)]pr(v = Lis = H,s' = H)

Denote:

Pre V = HI s = H) = ap+ (ap
)(
) =B
I-a l-p
Pr( V

= LI s

(1- a)(l- p)

= H) = ap+ (I-a)( l-p ) = I -

B

Optimal investment level when both signals indicate a good state:

Expected utility when s = H and s' = L (recall that the investor does not invest if s'=L):
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Finally, let m** denote optimal investment level with the purchased signal and m* - the optimal
investment level without the purchased signal. Then,

g(. I s =

(1 - q )(1 - B) ]
qB
(
)
H) = A [ u ( m * *, r ;. )
(
)(
) + u m * *, r ,.
(
)(
) +
H
qB + 1 - q 1 - B
L
qB + 1 - q 1 - B

•

With a log utility and after some simplifications:

g(.1 S

=

H) = ap+ (1
I-a )( I-p )

tapqIOg[(w - K)ll + raJ +
+

m· .(rH- roJ]

+ (1-

a)(I- P)(I- q)IOg[(w - K)(I + raJ +

m· .(rH- raJ])

+

[ap( I - q) + q( I - a)( I - p)] IOg[(w - K)[ I + r )] o

- {apIOg[(w)ll + raJ + m* (rH - raJ] + (I - a)(1 - P)IOg[(W{1 + raJ + m* (rH

-

roJ]}
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